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TOP ESPIONAGE MANAGEMENT.

 Chapter 1.     Be the best.

     1.1 Components of  intelligence

1. Biographic intelligence. Biographic intelligence is the study of  politicians, military, scientists and other persons of actual or potential importance through knowledge of their personalities and backgrounds, including  educational and occupational history, individual accomplishments, idiosyncrasies and habits, position and power to make decisions.
2. Economic intelligence. Economic intelligence studies the economic strengths and weaknesses of a country, including source of economic capability (any means a country has to sustain its economy), manufacturing (manufacturing processes, facilities, logistics), vulnerabilities (the degree to which a country's military would be hampered by the loss of materials or facilities), economic warfare (information on the diplomatic, financial and  special  steps a country may take to induce neutral countries to cease trading with its enemies).
3. Sociological intelligence. Sociological intelligence deals with people, customs, behaviors and institutions, including population (rates of increase, decrease or migrations), social characteristics (customs, values and beliefs), manpower (divisions and distribution within the workforce), health, education, welfare and public information (information services within the country).
4  Transportation and telecommunications  intelligence. Transportation and telecommunications intelligence studies the role of transportation and telecommunications systems during military emergencies and during peacetime, including strategic railways, highways, airports, seaports, network of navigatable rivers and canals, main phone and Internet services providers.
5  Military geographic intelligence. Military geographic intelligence studies all geographic factors, including  terrain, climate, natural resources, boundaries and population distribution.
6. Armed forces intelligence. Armed forces intelligence is the integrated study of the land, sea and air forces, including  strategy (military alternatives in terms of position, terrain, economics, politics ), tactics ( military deployments and operations doctrine), location, organizations, procurement, storage, distribution, weapons and training of the armed forces.
7. Political intelligence. Political intelligence valuates all political aspects which may affect military operations, including government structure, national policies, political dynamics (government views and reaction to events), propaganda (information and disinformation programs), special services, subversion (subversive acts sponsored by the government).
8. Scientific and technical intelligence. Scientific and technical intelligence studies the country's potential and capability to support objectives through development of  weapons and weapons systems, missile and space programs, nuclear energy and weapons technology, basic applied sciences. 1.2  Intelligence cycle.

 Equally important to the components of strategic intelligence is an awareness of the strategic intelligence cycle and the debriefer's role within that cycle. The first step is the identification of the intelligence gaps. Then analysts translate these gaps into intelligence requirements and strategic debriefer fulfills those requirements. Next step involves preparation of an intelligence report. The last step is the preparation of an intelligence report evaluation by the originator of the requirement. These evaluations measure the quality of the information as well as the quality of the report writing.

 
1.3 " Illegal " spies.

When I talk about "the best," I mean the highest intelligence level — illegal spies, intelligence operatives who are secretly deployed abroad and covertly operate there under assumed names and well-documented cover stories, masquerading as native citizens. It's very important if you get , for example, original birth certificate of American citizen, who died (at young age preferably) or any records and documents  on him(birth, wedding, death, any IDs, etc) .

The process of training and "installing" such officer is rather complex and includes:

a) Special training. Foreign language, general, political and special (espionage and counter-espionage) knowledge of the target country; personal cover story — new biography, special technical devices, recruitment methods). Up to three years.
b) Illegal probation period abroad. A trip abroad through intermediate countries with numerous changes of passports and cover stories, jobs, personal connections. Then he gets to the target country, stays there for another 1-2 years and goes back to his country for additional training and correction of cover story — actually, it's his first combat assignment. The most important part of this assignment is to check the reliability of the cover story and documents; the cover story has to be reinforced with new and old true facts, like short-term studies at universities or professional training courses).
c) Intermediate legislation. On his way back the officer could stay in an intermediate country for another 1-2 years, make contacts with business, scientists, government employees, celebrities.
d) Basic legislation. Officer comes to the target country, obtains genuine documents, gets a job which allows him to travel and talk to many people, recruit informants thus creating an illegal station.

The illegal is usually supplied with a variety of cover documents to make him "invisible" for counter-intelligence — some are used only to cross the borders on the way to a target country, others — to live there, other documents — only for travel to "third countries" to meet with officers of legal or illegal stations or to be used in case of urgent recall to home country (in that case the illegal is supposed to transit at least two or three countries). His further activity depends on how professional counter-espionage service is working in the country.
He could fail in his mission also because of:
- poor training and low quality documents
- neglecting security rules.
- one mistake in pronunciation can give you away
- treason (traitor-informant or a "mole" inside his own service)
- low personal security level (while working with sources)

If we talk about "legal plants", KGB (and modern Russian SVR) loves to recruite Harvard, Yale and Columbia students and "push" them to the top of American politics - US Congress, the White House, the Cabinet.

1.4  "Golden" rules

1. No mercy, no ideology, no emotions.
2. Intuition is nothing but the ability to watch and analyze.
3. No evidence is evidence in itself.
4. Distrust is a mother of security.
5. Never look as if you are sizing up the person — that's a sign that gives away cops and spies.
6. Don't start first if you don't know the rules.
7. The way you act is the way you think — behavior is a system of codes (information) which could be calculated by the enemy. Watch your face — that's a shop window.
8. Think fast, talk slow.
9. Avoid self-programming and never think bad about yourself.
10. Don't smoke, drink or take drugs if it's not necessary; spare your stomach from very hot or cold food or drinks; avoid too much noise and light.
11. Don't be shy to lie — the more you lie the more people respect you.
12. Let people talk out and "empty their brains" — then load your information.
13. People never change — everybody wants to get pleasure and avoid pain.
14. "He knew too much" means "He talked too much."
15. Never ask extra questions — wait. Wait and the object will get used to you and open himself — nobody can stay tense for long.
16. Lonely people live longer in espionage business.
17. "No exit" situation is the one you don't like or don't understand.
18. Avoid:
- personal enemies (they fix negative information on you)
- silent types (they notice and think too much)
- other professionals (they'll blow your identity)
- extra stress (it damages your heart and blood vessels and that kills your brain and your ability to think )
- talking too  much

1.5  CIA or KGB ?

CIA                                                                                                 KGB
                                                           
Cuts corners to save money on intelligence.                                    No limitations.
Poor professional training and knowledge.                                       KGB was famous for brilliant analysts.
"Country inside country."                                                                Mostly patriots.
Results first. Use people and get rid of them.                                   Security first. Respect your sources.
Promise and forget.                                                                       Promise and do it.
Saw Russia as #1 enemy.                                                             Saw US as #1 enemy.
 Money first.                                                                                 Job first.
 Alcohol.                                                                                      Alcohol.
"We are the best."                                                                         "No, we are the best".
Unreformable.                                                                                A fluid structure.

KGB

Since 1991, the KGB has been re-named the SVR (Russian Intelligence Service), but it has basically the same structure.

Structure
KGB Chief and his Deputies
Directorates:
"R" — operational planning and analysis
"K": external counter-intelligence
"S": illegal spies
"T": scientific and technical intelligence, acquisition of Western strategic, military and industrial technology.
"RI": intelligence assessment
"RT": operations within the Soviet Union
"OT": operational technical support
"I": computer services
"P": political intelligence
Geographic Departments.
Services:
"A": disinformation, covert actions to influence foreign nations and governments
"R": radio communications with overseas stations
"A" of the 8th Chief Directorate (cryptographic services)
KGB station abroad:
KGB Resident (Chief of the station).
"PR" line: political, economic and military strategic intelligence
"KR" line: counterintelligence and security
"X" line: scientific and technological intelligence
"N" line: illegal spies' support
"EM" line: émigrés
"SK" line: Soviet colony in the country
Embassy security officer
"OT" officer — operational technical support
"Impulse" station — monitoring of radio communications of surveillance teams
"RP" line officer: SIGINT
"I" line officer — computers
Cipher clerk
Radio operator

KGB inside humor:
 "Recruit a woman if you can't recruit anybody else."
"You can lose nothing and you can find nothing inside the KGB."
"Never make friends inside the KGB."
"Before lunch we fight hunger, after lunch we fight sleep."
"The law stops here."

 KGB slang sounds funny too: "music" (listening device), "Bible"(a book with listening device hidden inside), "gods"(officers who worked with informants inside churches and sects), "sailor" (informant — informant's KGB registration card was crossed by a red stripe), "crust" (KGB ID), "To take a skin off" (to take information from the informant), "to spin information" (to "enrich" information with false facts), "lime-tree" false information). There are still stereotypes about the KGB, like "KGB knows everything" or "KGB never arrests innocent citizens," or "KGB officers take special pills and that's why they are never drunk." Yes, KGB officers drink vodka on weekends and sometimes in the offices with regular Russian appetizers like smoked sausage or fish, caviar and pickles, but it's a rare thing to see somebody really drunk. They drink mostly to ease tension from the job and social isolation. If you don't drink alcohol with your colleagues it means disrespect and is not very good for your promotion. They take no pills and are just accustomed to regulate themselves.

 The KGB business goes in cycles and it's like any other bureaucratic government agency — July and August are "dead" months (vacations) as well as November and December (planning and waiting for promotion). The crazy busy months are January, February, March and June, because the departments and divisions chiefs try to do most of the job (especially recruitment) that was planned for the whole year. If you still don't do anything it's not a problem but if you miss the recruitment targets, you are in trouble. First, it's not professional and even your friends won't understand; second, it's a problem now for somebody else, because if you haven't met the recruitment target somebody has to recruit instead of you — and in a rush.
  KGB officers, due to professional demands, are physically fit, intelligent, well educated, have no mental problems and know how to talk and charm people — that's the art of recruitment. All these qualities create a big problem for married men (99% are married) because women like them. Almost every officer has a lover, but divorce is out of question. First, it's bad for your career, second, you and your bosses have a terrible headache, because if you divorce and want to marry again, they have to check this woman — she must have "clean" biography: no criminals in the family, no relatives abroad, no mentally ill family members and she has to be normal too. In earlier years, every KGB officer was a CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) member and there were no political problems between the Party leaders and KGB chiefs. Still, there existed a super-secret Special Investigation Department in Moscow which was responsible for investigation of espionage or other criminal activity by senior Party members or government officials.

1.5.2  What we learn from KGB practice:

1) KGB intelligence never tries to save money on agents, especially those recruited or planted inside foreign government bureaucracies and special services. This rule explains how KGB got the American nuclear bomb.
2) KGB tries to get its agents out of jail no matter what, unlike the CIA which treats such agents as "disposable."
3) The KGB practiced forcible confinement of dissidents in psychiatric hospitals, where debilitating drugs were administered (as an alternative to straightforward arrests and to avoid the unfavorable publicity that often arose with criminal trials).
4) Censorship of literature, media and art in general.
5) KGB mounted professional "active-measures" operations using forged US Government documents, pictures, evidences, stories, rumors and other "official" sources and media campaigns abroad to discredit all aspects of American policy and promote conflicts between the United States and its NATO allies and other states. No doubt the other top international agencies have similar operations throughout the world.
  The political effect of this type of operations can be very strong. American biological warfare was blamed for AIDS — it was "manufactured during genetic engineering experiments at Fort Detrick, Maryland." This information was "pushed" in 1986 through a retired East German, Russian-born biophysicist, professor Jacob Segal, who gave an interview to the British Sunday Express. He insisted that this extremely dangerous virus had been synthesized from two natural viruses, VISNA and HTLV-1. In the first six months of 1987 alone the story received major coverage in over forty third-world countries, and on German and British TV. Africa still believes the story.
  Another example is a widespread story that the United States is developing "ethnic-specific weapons" that would kill "nonwhites only." Some people think SARS and Ebola are among the results, and wonder what the Bird Flu is all about. Or — how about the "baby parts" story widely published in over 50 countries in which Americans were blamed for butchering Latin American children and using their bodies for organ transplants. And finally there is a widespread belief among American blacks that the CIA introduced them to crack cocaine to "slow down the civil rights movement." Some people wonder as well who was pushing marijuana and hallucinogenic drugs, free sex, wife-swapping, and a variety of other "trends" that tore the social fabric in the United States in the 1960s, a tear that has never been mended? Any of the top intelligence services could have a role in encouraging developments which weaken America; or which distract and deflect the energies of restless students, intellectuals, the media and others who might criticize the war.
6) Every KGB officer is an analyst, unlike CIA employees.
7) KGB intelligence (SVR) always pursues global goals, which are currently:
- to block NATO's expansion
- to block US hegemony
- to expand Russia's weapons market
- to continue high-tech, military and space technology espionage. (Before, the KGB was involved in the support of "national liberation wars" in the Third World, providing arms, advisers, military training and political indoctrination of leftist guerrillas.) In 1992 Russia signed an agreement on intelligence cooperation with China which is a direct threat to US national security.

There are two more important special services — FAPSI (Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information) and the Presidential Security Service. FAPSI is a target for us because its in charge of a special switchboard which includes coded telephone communications by Russian President, the prime minister and their assistants. FAPSI is also empowered to monitor and register all electronic financial and securities transactions and to monitor other electronic communications, including private Internet access.

1.6 GESTAPO

 GESTAPO, secret state political police with unquestionable powers to arrest opponents of the Nazi regime, including Communists, liberals, Freemasons, Protestants, Jehovah Witnesses, Jews. It was responsible for counter-espionage and counter-sabotage.

1.6.1  The Gestapo structure:
Referat N: Central Intelligence Office.
Department A (Enemies: Communists (A1), Countersabotage (A2), Reactionaries and Liberals (A3), Assassinations (A4)
Department B (Sects and Churches : Catholics (B1), Protestants (B2), Freemasons (B3), Jews (B4)
Department C (Administration and Party Affairs). The central administrative office of the Gestapo, responsible for card files of all personnel.
Department D (Occupied Territories : Opponents of the Regime (D1), Churches and Sects (D2), Records and Party Matters (D3), Western Territories (D4), Counter-espionage (D5).
Department E (Counterintelligence: In the Reich (E1), Policy Formation (E2), In the West (E3), In Scandinavia (E4), In the East (E5), In the South (E6).

The local offices of the Gestapo were known as Staatspolizeistellen and Staatspolizeileistellen; they answered to a local commander known as the Inspecteur der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD ("inspector of the security police and security services") who , in turn, was under the dual command of Referat N of the Gestapo and also his local SS and police leader. The Gestapo also maintained offices at all Nazi concentration camps, held an office on the staff of the SS and police leaders, and supplied personnel on an as-needed basis to such formations as the Einsatzgruppen. Such personnel, assigned to these auxiliary duties, was typically removed from the Gestapo chain of command and fell under the authority of other branches of the SS.

1.6.2   What we learn from Gestapo practices:

1. Investigated and fought against all activities which might endanger in any sense the security of Germany.
2. Kept operations simple and effective. Take for example the "public places total control" method: agents were recruited, first of all, at every big restaurant, bar, hotel or store. They delivered information on any client whose behavior was somewhat different from the general one: he was too excited or too depressed, too greedy or too generous, too open or too closed, too well dressed or vise versa, etc. And very often such a client deserved special attention.
3. Aggressive total recruitment - by the end of World War II there wasn't a single guerilla detachment, resistance or espionage group on occupied Soviet and European territories that had not been in part or completely eliminated by the GESTAPO or SD — 100 per cent professional counter-terrorist and counter-espionage job based on agent infiltration
4. The "Night and Fog" operation. By 1941 the RSHA analysts reported that the "taking hostages" practice was not effective any more as resistance on the occupied territories was even increasing after that went into effect. It was decided that resistance fighters had to be secretly arrested and secretly transported to Germany where, after investigation, they just vanished without a trace. The US in recent years has been taking insurgents and others arrested (often on suspicion alone) in Afghanistan, Iraq, and around the world, and transferring them via secret flights to secret jails in Eastern Europe and elsewhere for "interrogation". One might have predicted that the public outcry would quickly stamp out any such abomination as the prison at Guantanamo, but as we see the "current incivilities" have already gone on longer than World War II and the camp is still there.
5. The Gestapo was abhorred for using "third degree" methods of interrogation (see "Special Influence")
6 .The Gestapo had the power of the "protective custody", a euphemism for the power to imprison people without judicial proceedings, typically in concentration camps. The person imprisoned even had to sign his or her own order declaring that the person had requested imprisonment (ostensibly out of fear  of personal harm) – the signature was forced by tortures. People were sent to concentration camps if they, according to the Gestapo opinion, had received too little punishment. It was not only left-wing politicians and trade union activists who were sent to concentration camps. (The Gestapo also arrested beggars, prostitutes, homosexuals, alcoholics, drug addicts and anyone who was incapable to work).
 Besides, the Gestapo, actually, copied the KGB (NKVD) very effective structure and experience; they even coordinated joint actions. In March 1940 representatives of NKVD and Gestapo met for one week in Zakopane, Poland to "pacificate" resistance in this country. Then the Soviet Union delivered hundreds of German and Austrian communists to Gestapo, as unwanted foregners, with relevant documents.
7.  British and Americans did not want to deal with anti-Nazi. First, it was due to the aftermath of the Venlo incident of 1939, when Gestapo agents posing  as anti-Nazis in the Nethrlands kidnapped two British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) officers lured to a meeting to discuss peace terms. That prompted Winston Churchill to ban any further contact with the German opposition. In addition, the allies did not want to contact anti-Nazis because they feared that  Soviet dictator Stalin would believe they were attempting to make deals behind his back.

 
1.7  CIA   

StructureDirector  of the Central Intelligence  Agency
Deputy Director Associate Deputy Director
Associate Director for Military Support (the DCI principal advisor and representative on military issues.He coordinates Intelligence Community efforts to provide Joint Force commanders with timely, accurate intelligence; also supports Department of Defense officials who oversee military intelligence training and acquisition of intelligence systems and technology. A senior general officer, he ensures coordination of Intelligence Community policies, plans and requirements relating to support to military forces in the intelligence budget ).
National Intelligence Council
Office of Congressional Affairs
Center for the Study of Intelligence

Directorates:

Directorate of Administration
 Directorate of Intelligence Offices:
President's Support Division, Operations Center, DCI Crime and Narcotics Center, DCI Nonproliferation Center, Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff, Office of Advanced Analytic Tools, Office of Transitional Issues, Council of Intelligence Operations, Office of Support Services
Geographic Offices
Offices of Advanced Projects, Development and Engineering, Research and Development, Clandestine Information Technology Office, Technical Collection, Technical Service, Community Open Source Program, Foreign Broadcast Information
National Clandestine Service (Planning and carrying out covert destabilization operations, dissemination of propaganda, paramilitary operations, coordination between agencies)
Directorate of Plans
Counterintelligence Center
DCI Counterterrorist Center
National HUMINT (human intelligence) requirements center
Offices:
Communications, Facilities and Security Services, Finance and Logistics, Information Technology, Medical Services, Human Resources Management, Personnel Security, Training and Education, DCI Center for Security Evaluation, Center for Support Coordination

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was created by the National Security Act of 1947 to gather and analyze information from every corner of the globe and to provide the President with a covert operations capability. The CIA inherited the functions of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS).
It's supposed to:
- correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and provide for its appropriate dissemination
- collect, produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence (which if collected within the United States must be coordinated with the FBI)
- mcollect, produce and disseminate intelligence on foreign aspects of narcotics production and trafficking
- conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States and, without assuming or performing any internal security functions, conduct counterintelligence activities within the United States in coordination with the FBI
- conduct special activities approved by the President

Since 1947 the CIA has been on forward-march and has advanced inexorably.
Right after World war II , the CIA protected high profile Nazi war criminals, including Adolf Eicman; recruited tens of thousands of Nazis, many of whom were later sent to aid in operations in South America.
1951
Some outstanding CIA failures:
- failure to predict the June 1950 North Korea invasion of the South Korea
- failure to predict the "Fall of Czechoslovakia"
- failure to foresee "Tito's defection" from Moscow
- failure to predict the "Fall of Chinese Nationalists"
- failure to foresee the Israeli victory in Palestine
- failure to judge the mood of the Latin American states at the Bogota Conference in 1948
1960-1961
CIA with the help of Mafia assasins pursued a series of plots to poison or shoot Fidel Castro according to the assassination plots proposed by Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of the CIA Office of  Security.
1962
Prior to the 1962 Cuban crisis, the CIA reported to President Kennedy that the USSR wouldn't risk a nuclear war. During the crisis they insisted that the USSR might risk nuclear war. In both cases their National Intelligence Estimate was grossly off-base.
1968.
The CIA supported the Ba'ah Party coup d'etat against the government of Rahman Arif, with Saddam Hussein eventually assuming power.
1980
The Reagan transition team for the CIA (November, 1980) reported the following:
"The fundamental problem confronting American security is the current dangerous condition of the Central Intelligence Agency and of national intelligence collection generally. The failure of American intelligence collection has been at the heart of faulty defense planning and misdirected foreign policy."
  The team pointed out to the following intelligence failures:
- the general and continuing failure to predict the actual size and scope of the Soviet military effort and military sector of the Russian GNP
- the consistent gross misstatement of Soviet global objectives
- the wholesale failure to understand or attempt to counteract Soviet disinformation and propaganda
- the general failure to explain the characteristics of Soviet conventional weapon systems and vessels — for example the new Russian guided missile cruises
- the wholesale failure to understand and predict the nature of the so-called wars of national liberation in Africa and Central and South America
- the consistent miscalculation regarding the effect of and general apology for massive technology transfer from West to the East
- the apparent internal failure of counterintelligence generally.
The team went on to observe."The unhealthy symbiosis between the CIA and the Department of State is the chief underlying cause of the security position of the United States. The next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency … will be told repeatedly by virtually everyone in policy positions at the Agency that the CIA is a highly professional, non-political agency that produces ‘objective' intelligence. Those assertions are arrant nonsense. In part out of mutual drive for individual and corporate self-preservation, the CIA has become an elitist organization which engenders unshakable loyalty among its staff. The National Intelligence Estimate process is itself a bureaucratic game. These failures are of such enormity, that they cannot help but suggest to any objective observer that the agency itself is compromised to an unprecedented extent and that its paralysis is attributable to causes more sinister than incompetence."
1991
The CIA appears to have failed completely to predict the Soviet empire collapse and the end of the Cold War as such. Robert Gates, the fifteenth CIA Director (and later George W.'s Defense Secretary), as much as said in his acceptance speech on November 12, 1991 that the CIA is a mafia: "The people at Langley were more than a team; they were a family. I hope this sense of family, with all that implies, can be strengthened in the time ahead."
1992-1995.
CIA orchestrated a bomb-and-sabotage campaign against civilian and government targets in Baghdad .The civilian targets included, at least, one school bus,killing schoolchildren; a cinema, killing many people. The  campaign was directed by the CIA agent Dr. Iad Allawi, later installed as prime minister by the U.S.-led coalition after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.
1996
The House Permanent Select Committee om Intelligence issued a congressional report estimating that the clandestine service part of the intelligence community "easily" breaks "extremely serious laws" in countries around the world, 100,000 tiemes every year.
1998.
In 1996 the San Jose Mercury News wrote about the use of CIA aircraft, which had ferried arms to the Contras, to ship cocaine to the United States during the return flights. It was revealed also that Central America narcotics traffickers could import cocaine to the U.S. cities in the 1980's without the interference of normal law enforcement agencies; this led to the crack cocaine epidemic, especially in poor neighborhoods of Las Angeles, and CIA intervened to prevent the prosecution of drug dealers who were helping to fund the Contras. After that the CIA Inspector General Hitz was assigned to investigate these allegations. In 1998 the DCI George Tenet declared that he was releasing the report, which showed that the "CIA did not ‘expeditiously' cut off relations with alleged drug traffickers" and the "CIA was aware of allegations that ‘dozens of people and a number of companies connected in some fashion to the contras program' were involved in drug trafficking". 
The Kerry Committee report also found the the  U.S. State Department had paid drug ttraffickers  (!).
2001
The US lost 3,000 lives at Pearl Harbor in 1941 because someone was instructed not to pay attention to certain intelligence information that was available. Who was managing the intelligence and deciding where to look closer and where to turn a blind eye on September 11, when another 3,000 American lives were lost?
2005
Arrest warrants for 22 CIA agents were issued within the European Union. The agents are alledged to have taken an Egyptian,Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, a suspected terrorist, from Milan on February 17,2003 for extraordinary rendition to Egypt, where he was tortured.
German Khalid El-Masri filed a lawsuit against former CIA Direrctor George Tenet, claiming that he was transported from Macedonia to a prison in Afghanistan and held captive  there by the CIA for 5 months on a case of mistaken identity.

What We Learn from CIA Practice
Nothing positive.

1. The CIA's history up to today is a history of paralysis.
The grand problem is — our government can't preemptively handle foreign policy and national security matters because it has no adequate intelligence information; in fact it has no idea (neither has the CIA) what such high level political intelligence information would be.
Yes, I'm talking here about the Senate Intelligence Committee which has primary oversight responsibility for the CIA in Congress. Ask the National Security Agency to start intercepting world leaders' talks and phone calls worldwide — if we are spending this much money on NSA special intelligence, we ought to be able to intercept the calls and break the coded communications. This information would have to be the essence of the US President's Daily Briefings and this information has to be the base of National Intelligence Daily Report and National Intelligence Estimate — which is a regular failure of the CIA — many presidents ignore these reports as trash. This information would have to be the basis of National Security Council decisions. Sorry, we don't have a global US intelligence strategy or intelligence strategists and I'm not going to do the job while 16,000 "good ol' boys" drink the day away  at Langley.
2. I strongly recommend to stop the CIA's secret funding right now, funding that is not made public or audited by the Congress. The CIA has its own budget but they want more, which they will waste, and some so-called "operations" are financed by secret transfers of funds from the appropriations accounts of other agencies, primarily the Defense Department.
3. You can't reform the CIA — they are too accustomed to a comfortable existence, uncontrolled and irresponsible, because they, unlike military intelligence, do not function according to discipline, strict and understandable orders and patriotism.

The CIA has to be shut down, and its political intelligence functions and funding have to be transferred to the Defense Intelligence Agency. Platitudes like "the transition period is complex and takes time" are not convincing — military personnel should take over the Langley headquarters with not a single CIA employee (and all the inevitable "moles") within a week and start cleaning up the so-called top-secret papers and files, 90% of which is "information noise." While the CIA is a "family" ruled by the so-called "four princes" (heads of four directorates), the Army is a brotherhood of patriots whose leader is the US President, the Commander-in-Chief. He can trust them — show me a single American (or anyone else) who trusts the CIA. 
                                                                  

                            One of my attempts to reform CIA started with application for CIA Director position in 2002.

                  ______________________________________________________________________________________________________

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1.8  MOSSAD
The Israeli MOSSAD (Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks), formed in 1951, has responsibility for human intelligence collection, covert action and counterterrorism with the focus on Arab nations and organizations throughout the world.MOSSAD Structure
Director
Collection Department: espionage operations
Political Action and Liaison Department: political activities and liaison with friendly foreign intelligence services and with nations with which Israel does not have normal diplomatic relations —who is responsible for Israel's image, which is extremely low on the international arena? What these people are doing over there? Drinking kosher vodka?
LAP Department: psychological warfare, propaganda and deception operations. I have the same question for this department.
Research Department: intelligence production, including daily situations reports, weekly summaries and detailed monthly reports, weekly summaries and detailed monthly reports.
15 geographic sections.
Special Operations Division: assassination, sabotage, paramilitary and psychological warfare projects
Technology Department: development of advanced technologies to support operations

1.8.1 What we learn from MOSSAD practice:
1. Very effective method of non-stop 24/7 monitoring of all Arab terrorists leaders' movements all over the world. Don't you think they know where Osama Bin-Laden is? — if MOSSAD had informants among his aides before, it has them now.
2. Unlimited practice of political murders — which means MOSSAD has no idea how to recruit and work with Arab agents (monitoring is a passive tool).
3. MOSSAD has been super-active at the United Nations, with zero effect — 99% of the UN delegates vote against Israel on every issue.

  My Israeli colleagues have some unfortunate qualities: they promote an unprecedented level of PR according to which every MOSSAD officer is a genius and each MOSSAD Director is "Mr. Intelligence." MOSSAD unfortunately soiled its reputation in the international espionage community after the case of the exceptionally unprofessional John Pollard. The following morality tale emphasizes the first rule of recruitment — do not recruit psychos.
 John Pollard was born in 1954 in Texas to a Jewish family. He studied at Stanford University and being a schizophrenic and drug abuser, claimed he was a colonel in the Israeli army and a MOSSAD spy. After Stanford the US Navy hired him in 1979 as a civilian intelligence analyst at Naval Operational Surveillance and Intelligence Center, the Naval Intelligence Support Center and the Naval Investigative Center.In 1984 they brought him into the Anti-Terrorism Alert Center where he gained access to the whole federal intelligence system and a high level of clearance known as SCI or Sensitive Compartmented Information, and a special "courier card" that opened the CIA, FBI, State Department and National Security Agency restricted archives for him.
  In May 1984, through a New York businessman, he was introduced to Israeli Air Force colonel Aviem Sella. Pollard told him that he had positive proof that the USA, the only Israel's ally, friend and sponsor, was not sharing all the intelligence data it should with Israel, and Pollard was angry with the US and willing to help his historic motherland. (In truth, although Israel does not share much with the US, Israel was receiving full political, economic and military support from the US plus $3 billion a year at that time — and even more in recent years.) The report about the "walk-in" volunteer was passed to Rafi Eitan, the LACAM (Israeli military technology espionage agency) chief, and in a month Pollard was recruited. For a year Pollard was supplying Israel with top secret documents, including satellite reconnaissance photographs which were of a special interest to LACAM. The documents were going straight to Prime Minister Shimon Pres, Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
Finally on November 21, 1985 the FBI went after him. In a chase, he made it into the Israeli embassy in Washington, DC, but the MOSSAD officers threw him out. He may spend the rest of his life in jail. So far President George Bush and President Bill Clinton have refused the multiple Israeli requests to pardon him.

Since 2000 MOSSAD has advertised its recruitment of collection officers (a concept which is unthinkable for the KGB).

1.9 Ministry of State Security (MSS), China. 

 China's MSS aggressively targets the US high tech sector heavily concentrated in Silicon Valley. Cover for Beijing's espionage includes the 1,500 Chinese diplomats, 15,000 Chinese students who arrive here each year and 2, 700 visiting delegations each year and the US correspondents of the major Chinese newspapers, including The People's Daily and Xinhua News Agency. (Altogether the MSS has established "branches" in 170 cities in nearly 50 countries all over the world). Here what communist China is doing in the United States.
 1998 was a very special year. We got 4 (four) cases of suspected Chinese espionage against the United States dating back to the 1980s. The most serious case involved China's alleged acquisition of key information about our nation's most advanced miniaturized US nuclear warhead, the W-88, as well as serious security breaches at the Department of Energy (DOE) Los Alamos Laboratory between 1984 and 1988. In 1997 Dr. Peter Lee, who worked  in Los Alamos on classified projects  relating to the use of lasers to stimulate nuclear detonations, was convicted for passing classified national defense information to China's representatives. In 1999, FBI arrested Wen Lee, a Taiwan-born Chinese American scientist, who downloaded critical nuclear weapons codes, called legacy codes, from a classified computer system at Los Alamos to an unclassified system accessible to anyone with the proper password.  Same year the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board presented a report saying that  DOE "is a dysfunctional bureaucracy that has proven it is incapable of reforming itself".
  China is striving to acquire advanced American technology of any sort, whether for military or civilian purposes, as part of its government program to improve its entire economic infrastructure –  a direct threat to our national security. They are mostly interested in astronautics, information technology, laser technology, automation technology, energy technology, new materials. Watch, if you have to deal with China Aerospace Corporation (CASC) and its Hong Kong subsidiary China Aerospace International Holdings, China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), China North Industries Group (NORINCO), Aviation Industries Corporation of China (AVIC), China Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Company, China National South Aero-Engine and Machinery Company, Qinghua University Nuclear Research Institute,  China International Trade and Investment Company (CITIC), Polytechnologies Corporation, China Great Wall Industry Corporation, China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO).

  China is trying to steal from us information in the following areas of military concern:
1. Biological warfare. Gene researches (bioengineering) that could have biological warfare application.
2. Space technology. Satellites with remote sensing capabilities, which could be used for military reconnaissance, as well as space launch vehicles.
3. Military information technology. Intelligent computers, optoelectronics, image processing for weather forecasting; the production of submicron integrated circuits on 8-inch silicon wafers. These programs could lead to the development of military communications systems; command, control communications and intelligence systems; advances in military software development.
 4. Laser weapons. Pulse-power techniques, plasma technology and laser spectroscopy, all of which are useful in the development of laser weapons.
5. Automation technology. Computer-integrated manufacturing systems and robotics. Electronics, machinery, space, chemistry, telecommunications.
6. Nuclear weapons.
7. Exotic materials. Optoelectronic information materials, structural materials, special function materials, composites, rare-earth metals, new energy compound materials that could advance the development of military aircraft.

 The primary professional China's intelligence services, involved in military technology espionage are the Ministry of State Security (MSS) and the PLA General Staff's Military Intelligence Department (MID). The MSS relies on a network of non-professional individuals and organizations acting outside the direct control of the intelligence services, including scientific delegations and China nationals working abroad.

 China also adopted a three-track approach to acquiring US equipment and technologies:
-the diversion of parts or tools from commercial end uses
-direct purchase
-joint ventures

   1.9.1 Traitor Bill Clinton.

  In 1996 , Sunbase Asia, Incorporated purchased Southwest Products Corporation, A California producer of ball bearings for US military aircraft. Sunbase is incorporated in the United States, but is owned by an investment group comprised of some of the PRC's largest state-owned conglomerates as well as a Hong Kong company. According to a Southwest executive, the purchase will "take (Sunbase) to the next" level of technology. The Clinton administration determined that additional information on this transaction could not be made public without affecting national security (?!).
  In 1997, China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), the PRC's state-owned shipping company which operates under the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation and answers to the PRC State Council, attempted to lease port space that was being vacated by the US Navy in Long Beach, California. The lease proposal led to a heated debate  between Congress, which wanted to prevent the lease based on national security concerns, and President Clinton, who supported the lease. Legislation passed by both houses of Congress barred the lease and voided the President's authority to grant a waiver.
  A year earlier US Customs confiscated over 2,000 assault rifles AK-47 that were being smuggled into the United States aboard COSCO ships. The Clinton administration determined that additional information concerning COSCO could not be made public without affecting national security (?!). The House Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China (Cox Committee) received evidence of PRC theft of technology data from US industry during the 1990s valued at millions of dollars. China used Chinese nationals for that purpose. The Clinton administration has determined that no details of this evidence may be made public without affecting national security.

  Chinese intelligence targets the US high-tech sector, but what is much more important is China's strategy to bribe the President, Senators and Representatives by discreetly financing, through intermediaries, federal and state elections. In such a way China is getting favorable American treatment on trade policy, including selling nuclear weapons and technology to such countries as Iran and Libya. In 1991 the National Security Agency intercepted communications indicating that China was trying to "influence" 30 Congressional candidates (mostly Democrats) through campaign contributions. Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich was one of those candidates. According to James F. Lilley, a former US Ambassador to China: "The FBI discovered Chinese efforts to interfere in American campaigns as early as 1991 and warned a number of Democratic members of Congress to watch for Chinese donations passed through intermediaries…It's the way they operate in Asian countries. They do it by bribing government officials; they bribe them to change policy." Senator Fred Thompson, who chaired the 1997 campaign finance hearings, said that "High-level Chinese government officials crafted a plan to increase China's influence over the US political process, and took specific steps to do so, including the allocation of substantial sums of money to influence federal and state elections."
 Secret services always conduct detailed research before they "do" a certain person, and in Bill Clinton they found one who was a ripe target. China recruited Johnny Chung, a democratic fundraiser, who got $100,000 from another agent, Liu Chaoying (who worked on defense modernization for China People's Liberation Army), and gave the money to Democratic National Committee. Then, by the order of Chung's boss, general Ji Shengde, $300,000 were deposited into the Torrance businessman's account to subsidize campaign donations intended for Clinton. Another $500,000 were "donated" to an international trading firm, established by a former Clinton's aide. Then Chung escorted the wife and son of Chinese military intelligence to a political fundraiser in Los Angeles in 1996, at which Democratic officials asked for a $25,000 contribution for the opportunity to introduce his "friends" to Bill Clinton. And then Clinton overrode then-Secretary of State Warren Christopherson's decision to limit China's ability to launch American-made satellites on Chinese rockets. Later Bernard Schwartz, the "Loral" CEO and the largest individual contributor to the DNC, appeared on the stage. What happened? I don't know what happened in 1996, but in 1998 the US federal grand jury was investigating whether "Loral" illegally gave China space expertise that significantly advanced Beijing's ballistic missile program. Schwartz was ready to export to China airborne reconnaissance cameras, weapon delivery systems, and target acquisition and missile guidance systems. Clinton "shut up" the federal grand jury by approving the "Loral" deal. Bravo, China!

1.10 Federal Intelligence Service (BND), Germany
Like the KGB, the German BND chose total global espionage as its basic strategy. This means strong government support, perfect semi-classified financing. It means Germany wants to dominate not only in Europe but worldwide — a very dangerous tendency if you think about the past. I once met a BND officer under cover as an engineer in Ukraine; we had beer and vodka and he talked to me pretty straight about Ukraine and its post-Chernobyl radioactive future. He informed me about a super-secret deal Ukrainian President Kravchuk signed with Germany, allowing the transfer of German radioactive waste to Ukraine). The BND is very sensitive to international illegal weapons, radioactive materials and the drugs trade.

1.11 General Directorate for External Security (DGSE), France
French security officials, like those of other countries, are suspicious of foreigners and have perhaps less mercy and respect for their colleagues and for quarries from other countries. In the USA they are very aggressive in high-tech and industrial espionage.

1.12 Secret Intelligence Service (MI6, "The Firm"), Great Britain
Thank God, our British friends don't seem to be focusing on us — but who knows? Right now they are too busy working against Germany (industrial and military secrets) and France (military technology). God bless them.

    Chapter  2.   Special Influence
 
1. Tortures

Torture is a category of methods of interrogation designed to shock, hurt and humiliate the object and get information or to make him do something (if used for blackmail). Points to remember:
-ongoing torture decreases pain sensitivity
-people with strong will power take torture as a test
-resistance to torture is often a form of hysterics after arrest
-the object could take himself as a martyr if you torture him too much
-torture could damage object's psyche and you won't be able to work with him (that's why we keep terrorists in Guantanamo Bay without trial – we turn them into idiots)
-people usually trust "after torture information" more than voluntary confessions
-there are different types of torture and professionals often combine them

 Techniques of psychological torture include:
- fake execution
- complete isolation ("wall therapy")
- daylight deprivation
- forcible narcotics addiction. Here you can use  depressants, stimulants, opiates or hallucinogens (psychodelics): depressants (alcohol, barbiturates, antianxiety drugs
 with effects of euphoria, tension reduction, disinhibition, muscle relaxation, drowsiness; stimulants (cocaine, amphetamine, methamphetamine (crystal meth),  with effects of  fast
- euphoria, exhilaration, high physical and mental energy, reduced appetite, perceptions of power , and sociability; hallucinogens  with effects of euphoria, hallucinations, distorted perceptions and    sensations
-making the object observe others being tortured (such as family members)
-abuse of object's national, religious feelings or political views)
The effects of psychological torture are: anxiety, depression, fear, psychosis, difficulty concentrating, communication disabilities, insomnia, impaired memory, headaches, hallucinations, sexual disturbances, destruction of self-image, inability to socialize

Techniques of physical torture include:
-food, water, sleep deprivation
-damage to vital body organs (brain, lungs, kidneys, liver, private parts) plus electric shock. The brain is particularly dependent on a continuous and stable supply of oxygen and glucose.
-rape
-face deformation
-water cure ( the torturer pours water down the throat of the subject to inflict the terror of drowning. In another variation, the subject is tied or held don in a chair, his face is covered with a cloth or plastic sheet, and water is poured slowly or quickly over his face to encourage him to talk
The effects of physical torture are: extreme (unbearable) pain, hypertension, fatigue, cardio-pulmonary and other disorders, brain atrophy.

2. Special psychology

1. "Brain washing" (implantation of new ideas). The process is: isolation from outside world ("information vacuum") — sleep and food limitation (very effective) — "bombing" with slogans - ideological aggression - achieving the result (brain is loaded). The object is now ready to brainwash newcomers.
2. "Behavior modification" (by placing into a group). The process is: initial contact — introduction to a group — mutual interests — mutual activity–mutual ideas — control and prevention of any negative contacts outside the group. No rush, no pressure.
3. Special psychotherapy methods: talk + drugs + blondes + alcohol (used for recruitment)
Attention: An alcoholic is more impulsive, untrustful and unreliable; he demonstrates a poverty of ideas and incapacity for attention. He usually has serious personality maladjustments. He's immature, insecure, oversensitive and anxious. Without alcohol he's unable to meet and enjoy people socially, and suffers from marked feeling of inferiority. Besides, alcoholics suffer from vitamin B1 deficiency, which leads to anatomic changes in the central nervous system and heart with symptoms like anorexia, fatigability, and sleep disturbances. Other common symptoms are irritability, poor memory, inability to concentrate, heart pain.
4. "Transfer" (the object is placed in a regular hospital and then he's transferred to a mental health clinic or jail). In jail you can use such methods an accelerated work schedule (to exhaust the object), turning him into a number to traumatize his psyche, physical punishment or a threat of punishment to keep the object tense and depressed; senseless labor to destroy his personality. Remember: the lower the intellectual level of the object, the more aggressive he is and more sensitive to incentive or punishment.
You can actually re-organize any object's behavior by combining rewards and punishments, exposing him to feared situations and teaching him an instinct of a total (political) obedience.
  Imprisonment is a very strong (sometimes — ultimate) tool. My friend who spent 10 years in jail described the changes in his behavior like this:
1st year — aggression as self-defense method (to survive)
2nd year — less personal tension, attempts to adapt the mind and body to the new, isolated way of life
3rd, 4th, 5th — gaining some inside status
6th, 7th — life in jail looks like natural routine
10th — euphoria before gaining freedom

3. Blackmail
Used to force a person to do something (or stop the action) against his will; it's used also for recruitment. Blackmail methods include:

1. Leaking "dirt" on the object through media
2. Creating problems in his personal life and career
3. Straight blackmail (threatening to make public certain compromising facts about him)
4. Placing weapons, drugs, secret documents in object's house or office, followed by search and arrest
5. Accusations of rape (robbery) (use hookers for that)
6. Blackmail by pressing family members. Careful, object may commit suicide after intense blackmail, especially if he is an intellectual

Article Source: http://www.articlesbase.com/politics-articles/espionage-management-part-1-mikhail-kryzhanovsky-kgb-and-cia-4895547.html

About the Author

Mikhail Kryzhanovsky

=================

.

30 years of international espionage experience

KGB Counterintelligence School

KGB Intelligence Institute

a former KGB intelligence officer

a former KGB "Nabat" anti-terror group sniper

a former SBU (Ukrainian Security Service) illegal intelligence officer

a former CIA/FBI "Filament"

the author of the White House Special Handbook, Algora,2007

the author of the US National Security System, 2011

unemployed

prof7prof@yahoo.com

Author: thessayist
1      Introduction

The link between crime and drug use is an established fact, fortified by a wealth of empirical evidence  and, certainly, not a claim premised upon weak assumptions.  It is this link and the strong foundations upon which it is established which has motivated the design and implementation of drug rehabilitation programmes for prison inmates in the UK, just as it has in the United States, Australia and most Western European nations.  As Johnson, Lipton, and Wish (2001) explains, given the link between drugs and crime, the implementation of drug rehabilitation programmes in prisons may be defined as a strategy for the reduction of recidivism rates and for the assurance of the successful re-integration of offenders into their societies.  It is, in other words, an integral part of prisoner rehabilitation programmes which target the possibilities of recidivism by addressing their root causes, in this case, drugs.

While not claiming that drugs are responsible for the entirety of the recidivism rate which the UK currently suffers, it is one of its more important causes (Burnett, 2004).  Drug rehabilitation programmes for offenders has the potential to significantly reduce recidivism rates and, thus, to reduce the nation's overall crime rate (Burnett, 2004).  Indeed, Burnett (2004), a criminologist and offender management expert and researcher,  argues that the Drug Treatment and Testing Order (DTTO) and the Drug  Rehabilitation Requirement (DRR)  which evolved from it,  derive from the empirically-proven link between drugs and crime and are motivated by the imperatives of reducing the nation's crime rates by confronting one of the primary causes of recidivism. This research, however, will not proceed from a premise of unquestioning acceptance of the correlation between addiction and crime, hence treatment and reduction in recidivism rates.  Instead, the research will critically analyse attempts to divert drug users out of the prison system and reduce recidivism rates through their inclusion in drug treatment programmes, with particular reference to DTTO and DRR.  The study will first begin with the identification and definition of its key terms, following from which it will discuss the relationship between drugs and crime, review causal models of the drug-crime relationship and then examine the extent to which DTTO and DRR have  emerged as solutions, at least partial, to the problem under investigation.

2      Overview of Key Terms

The research employs four key-terms.  This section of the study will briefly resent and define each one of them.

2.1    DTTO

Drug Treatment and Testing Orders, a type of community sentence, were introduced within the framework of the Crime and Disorder Act of 1998 (Hough et al., 2003, p. 1).  As Hough et al (2003) explain, DTTOs "were designed as a response to the growing evidence of links between problem drug use and acquisitive offending."   As such, they are a sentencing scheme which is designed to rehabilitate heavy drug users and, in so doing, facilitate their reintegration into society and limit the potential for their re-offending.

2.2    DRR

According to a Home Office (2005) publication on  drug rehabilitation programmes Drug Rehabilitation Requirement entered into force in  April 2005 as a replacement for DTTOs.  The Home Office (2005, para 3) defines DRR as "the main delivery route for drug interventions within community sentences for adult offenders. It involves treatment (either in the community or in a residential setting) and regular drug testing."

2.3    Therapeutic Community

Therapeutic Community Programmes were the first drug rehabilitation programmes specifically targeting prison inmates.  They were premised on the assumption that heavy drug use and crime were inextricably linked and that reduction in recidivism was dependant on rehabilitating imprisoned drug users (Palmer, 2003).  DTTOs, according to Palmer (2003) evolved from within the therapeutic community construct.

2.4    Problem Drug Users

Problem drug users are heavy drug and alcohol users, addicts.  Their addiction, according to several researchers, mitigates their ability to lead productive lives, function as constructive community and societal members and often pushes them towards crime as a strategy for sustaining their habit  (Sampson and Laub, 2001; Raynor and Vanstone, 2002).

3      Connecting Drugs and Crime

While many studies have focused on the relationship between drugs and crime, these studies do not always differentiate between alcohol and illegal drug use. Many studies solely examine the pharmacological effects of alcohol or drugs, while others examine the economic relationship between drugs and crime.

3.1    Alcohol

Empirical evidence suggests that alcohol plays a significant role as a factor in violent crime. In fact, alcohol has been a key factor in rising homicide rates since 1960 (Parker and Rebhun, 1995). Based on their study concerning the connection of drugs and alcohol to violent crimes, Parker and Rebhun (1 995) concluded that alcohol is more related to violent crime than any other drug. Specifically, alcohol played a bigger role in murder, rape, assault, and child and spousal abuse than any illicit drug. In an examination of the pharmacological and economic effects of alcohol compared to the popular drug crack, Parker and Rebhun (1995) found that alcohol was evident in approximately 20 percent of all violent crimes, while crack was a factor in only 3 percent. In the same study, they found that 17 percent of all property crimes took place while the individual was under the influence of alcohol.

Studies show that more than one-half of all homicides and assaults involve the use of alcohol (Collins and Messerschrnidt, 1993; Roizen, 1993). Using interviews of inmates, Spiess and Fallow, 2000 (2000) reported that about one-third of inmates report committing crimes while under the influence of alcohol. In fact, in both individual-level and macro-level studies, Cook and Moore (1993) determined that rates of homicide and other forms of criminal activity were positively correlated with the availability and per capita consumption of alcohol. Furthermore, they argued that in cities where efforts to reduce drinking have taken place, a decrease in violent crime was also evident.

3.2    Illegal Drugs

Based on figures alone, it would be incorrect to make the assumption that there is a direct causal relationship between drug use and criminality, though studies of heroin addicts dominate the literature because of the apparent link to crime (Ball et al., 1983). Studies of heroin users concluded that active drug use accelerates a drug user's crime rate by a factor of four to six times  (Ball et al., 1983; Johnson, Lipton, and Wish, 2001). Findings relating criminality to cocaine use have been reported  (Goldstein., 1981). Initial impressions from studies of crack-related crime indicate that the crime rate among crack users is as high or higher than heroin-related crime rates.  Furthermore, results from an Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) report (2000) suggest that drugs may generate violent crime, whether based on the competition of the illegal drug trade, the disputes among users and sellers, or the lack of social control among addicts. In another example of the drugs-violence relationship, a study by Valdez, Yin and Kaplan (1997) examined data to predict the outcome of aggressive crime from drug and alcohol-related variables within a sample of 2,364 males. Overall, they found that being charged with an aggressive crime was related to testing positive for drug use. It is on the basis of these studies and several others (Sampson and Laub, 2001; Raynor and Vanstone, 2002; Palmer, 2003; Burnett, 2004) that, regardless of the reasons, there appears to be a pattern of findings suggesting that violence often accompanies drug use.

4      Causal Models of Drug-Crime Relationship

According to Goldstein (198l), four causal models explain the connection between drugs and criminal activity. The first of these, the psychopharmacological model, suggests that the individual is physically and psychologically affected by his drug intake, causing him to act out. This becomes more apparent in individuals that do not already have a violent personality, as the drugs can cause a normally rational person to act out of character. Of the studies that have been done, psychophannacological effects have been found more consistently in alcohol than in any other drug use.  Psychopharmacological effects have also been shown in studies of illicit drugs. Barbiturates can often lead to violent or aggressive behaviour. The chronic use of marijuana, opiates, and amphetamines also increases the risk for violence (Miczek et al., 1994). Although psychophannacologica1 research does not match criminal activity with a corresponding drug, the research does explain potential causal relationships between drugs and crime (White and Gorman, 2000).

The second model, economic motivation, addresses the need for money to support an addiction to illegal drugs (Goldstein, 1981). Support for this model comes mainly from the literature on heroin addiction. Studies offering evidence of economic motivation show that raising the frequency of substance use necessarily raises the rate of individual offending, especially property crime (Sampson and Laub, 2001).

Self-report research regarding the criminal histories of inmates offers a  picture of economic motivation. According to a 1991 survey of prison inmates, an estimated 17%  reported committing their offense to get money to buy drugs (Spiess and Fallow, 2000). In 1997, 19% of inmates admitted to committing their crimes to obtain money for drugs (Spiess and Fallow, 2000). Overall, these figures help to demonstrate the economic connection between drug addiction and crime.

The systemic modelis the third explanatory model for the drug-crime relationship. This model suggests that negative interactions within the drug market occur because of the sale or distribution of illegal drugs (Goldstein, 1981). As an example, drug-related homicides increased significantly with the introduction of crack in 1985, suggesting that systemic violence may be associated with the popular drug of the time period (Blumstein, 1995).

A fourth model that can be used to explain the drug-crime relationship is the common cause model, also referred to as the lifestyle model of substance abuse.Essentially, this model suggests that substance abuse and criminal behaviour share several common causes and predictors. This model argues that there is no one specific characteristic or variable that causes substance abuse, but that a host of variables play a role in the connection between drugs and criminal activity. As an example, Jessor and Jessor (2000) found that variables such as cigarette use, promiscuous sexual activity, excessive drinking, using marijuana and other drugs, stealing, and aggression were linked in a cluster of behaviours negatively associated with conventional behaviour.

On the basis of the information discussed above, it is apparent that there is an undeniable link between crime and drug use.  Realisation of this link led to the belief that imprisonment was an opportunity for the rehabilitation of drug addicts, with the assumption being that successful treatment was a safeguard against recidivism.

5      Prison-Based Drug Treatment

Prison-based drug treatment programmes are integral to the efforts to rehabilitate criminals and ensure their reintegration into society and a strategy for the reduction of recidivism rates.  This section of the research will critically discuss prison-based drug treatment programmes and, in so doing, will attempt to identify the advantages which DTTO/DRR have over their predecessor, TC, if any.

5.1    Therapeutic Community

Research has shown that the most effective and efficient method of imprison treatment is the therapeutic community (TC). The first TC in a correctional setting was created in 1962 in the Nevada state prison, with several more to follow in the latter half of the decade, eventually spreading to the United Kingdom and several other West European nations (Inciardi and Martin, 1993).  Therapeutic communities gradually became a popular treatment modality, based on evidence that the TC model was an effective tool for addiction treatment in a prison setting. Farrell (2002) found that among TC program graduates followed seven years after treatment, success rates exceeded 5 percent, meaning that inmates discontinued both their drug use and criminal activity. Conversely, program dropouts followed during the same time period showed only a 30 percent success rate (Farrell, 2002). While there is little consensus about what types of treatment work best for what types of offenders and in what settings, several studies have demonstrated that in-prison treatment, particularly the TC model, can be effective in reducing relapse and recidivism among drug-involved offenders (Simpson, Wexler and Inciardi, 1999).

The rationale for the therapeutic community is that a person needs treatment for the diseaseof addiction. Most TC programs view the disease as multidimensional, affecting alltraits of the individual, including his social, psychological, and physical attributes. Therefore, the goal of TC is to develop a change in the client's lifestyle as well his social and psychological characteristics. According to De Leon (1996: 52),addiction, and more specifically substance abuse, is "embedded in a larger picture of personality disorder, social deviance, disaffiliation, and personal dysfunction." Based on this concept, TC treats drug abuse as deviant behaviour that reflects poor personality development, as well as deficits in social, educational, and economic skills (Farrell, 2002).

Since addiction affects the entire person, the recovery cannot take place without treating all aspects of the individual. The therapeutic community is different from other types of drug abuse treatment in that it provides a residential setting for abusers, offering them an environment to change their lifestyle free of societal pressures. A main problem for drug-related offenders is that their community environment outside of prison is often a large contributor to their drug-related activities (De Leon, 2002).Therefore, offering the offender a treatment environment void of familiar, self-defeating characteristics allows for the chance of full recovery.

Recognising that drug addiction is a multidimensional problem is half the battle; the other half is recognising the various stages of the addiction and getting the addict to accept treatment as a necessary part of his life. De Leon (1996; 2002) describes ten distinct stages that addicts pass through in a TC treatment program. The first six stages are pretreatment stages, all of which take place before the addict accepts the treatment as rehabilitation. The first of these stages is denial, during which the individual experiences active personal abuse and associated problems, but fails to either recognise or accept that he has a problem.   In the second stage, ambivalence, the addict demonstrates some problem recognition but an inconsistent acceptance of the consequences of continued drug use on both himself and others. However, the abuser attributes his drug problems to external influences rather than seeking treatment or change. Some examples of these external motivations include fears and worries about legal problems, money issues, health problems, family concerns, or other social responsibilities.

In the next stage, readiness for change, the addict displays a willingness to seek change, but at this point he often chooses options that are not treatment related. As an example, the drug user will choose to change geography, religion, jobs, or relationships rather than choosing treatment because he feels that self-management is the key to detoxification. Eventually, he realises that this is not feasible and becomes ready for treatment. In this stage, the abuser rejects all other options for change except treatment, perceiving treatment as the only alternative. It is here that the addict realises that he needs to change himself, not only his environment and relationships (De Leon, 1996; De Leon, 2002).  During this phase, the abuser also develops intrinsic motivation to change. The abuser shows recognition of drug use and the associated problems and expresses a desire to change based on the positive and negative internal reasons. At this point of addiction, the addict realises that change starts with his own desire for rehabilitation and that treatment is a necessary part of recovery. Once the abuser realizes that treatment is a necessity, treatment-related stages emerge and therapeutic engagement begins. These include de-addiction, which is a detachment from active use, essentially creating a pharmacological and behavioural detoxification; abstinence, which is a stabilised drug freedom for an extended period of time; continuance, in which sobriety and personal resolve is utilized to acquire and maintain a lifestyle free of drugs; and integration and identity change, which allows for the separation from treatment for a sustained period and entry into a new lifestyle. At this point, self-examination has taken place, and sobriety is internalised (De Leon, 1996; De Leon, 2002).

The above investigation into drug rehabilitation programmes aimed at inmates speaks of a decades' long understanding of the relationship between drug use/addiction and criminality.  While recognition is important, it can hardly be acted upon in relation to individuals who have not yet been accused of, or have been found guilty of, having committed a crime.  The prison setting, however, provides an ideal opportunity to act upon this recognition and, indeed, has been found to contribute to the reduction of recidivism rates.  It is precisely because of this that prisons across the UK have implemented drug rehabilitation programmes which generally assume the TC form.  It is further because of this that DTTOs and DRR have been designed and passed into legislature.

5.2    DTTO and DRR

In direct comparison to TC, DTTO/DRR are proactive, rather than reactive approaches to the reduction of crime rates through the treatment of drug addiction.  TC unfolds within the prison setting and, as such, may be defined as the state's response to drug addiction among incarcerated individuals.  DTTO/DRR unfold, however, within the community setting and may be defined as mandatory treatment programmes which target drug addicts for the purposes of  reducing the possibilities of their embracing criminality as a way of life.  It is, in other words, a proactive response to crime which involves the targeting of individuals deemed vulnerable to criminality.

According to a report prepared for the House of Commons by the National Audit Office (2004)  noted that  mandatory drug testing of individuals arrested in the commission of crime found that between 36 to 66% had committed their offences while under the influence of drugs.  Based on these findings, the Home Office introduced DTTO, designed to reduce crime rates through the mandatory, court-ordered enrolment of offenders tested positive for drugs, in community drug treatment programmes (NAO, 2004).  Introduced under the Crime and Disorder Act (1998), DTTO became available to courts in England and Wales from October 2000 and gave courts the authority to sentence offenders to mandatory community treatment programmes, involving regular testing for drugs for determination of compliance with the programme (NAO, 2004).

Prior to the nation-wide implementation of DTTO, pilot studies were carried out in England and Scotland between 1999 and 2000.  The results of the studies were positive and underscored the potential of court-ordered mandatory, community-based, drug treatment programmes to treat drug addicts and, accordingly,  contribute to the assurance that they abandon crime (Eley et al., 2002).  Turnull (1999) confirms these findings.  He notes that the pilot studies indicated a significant reduction of drug use among participants and an associate decrease in crime.  While conceding to the fact that a significant percentage of participants did not end their drug use following treatment, Turnbull (1999) emphasises that they transited from hardcore to soft drugs and significantly reduced their levels of drug use.  Indeed, the findings of these pilot studies indicated that the average expenditure of offender-participants went from 500 pounds sterling per week before treatment to 30 pounds sterling per week after completion of the treatment programme (Turnbull, 1999).  The results of these pilot studies encouraged the nation-wide implementation of DTTO.

Post-implementation study results were not very encouraging.  As Hough et al (2004) report, a two year follow-up study indicated that recidivism rates were not significantly affected.  Studying 161 offenders who had received DTTO, the authors found that programme completion rates were very low, standing at about 30%.  For the population which did not complete the treatment programme, reconviction rates stood at about 80% while for those who did, recidivism rates were significantly reduced (Hough, 2004).  The point here is that while DTTO has the potential to reduce reconviction rates, low completion rates limit the ability of DTTO to fully realise their potential.  Turnball and Webster (2007) make the same argument for DRR.  The potential is there but it is not realised because significant numbers of offenders do not complete the programme and tend to take it lightly.  It is, thus, that critics argue the imperatives of ensuring compliance or locking up offenders and subjecting them to in-prison treatment programmes as opposed to community-based ones (Turnbull and Webster, 2007).

6      Conclusion

The research study has argued that the link between drugs and criminal behaviour cannot be ignored.  Supported by empirical evidence and the subject of countless research studies, scholars and criminologists have argued that the reduction of the crime rate is partially predicated on the targeting of this link.  The argument here is predicated on the assumption that the treatment of addiction can substantially decrease the probabilities for recidivism and, quite possibility, offset the possibilities of their eventual embrace of criminality as a way of life which, primarily determined by the imperatives of supporting their habit.  This link has been targeted through programmes which unfold within the prison setting and others which take place within the community setting.  The former have been found effective but the latter, which assume the form of DTTO and DRR, have not. This is not because the foundations of DTTO/DRR are weak or inherently flawed but because programme completion rates are low and, hence, recidivism rates are high.  It is, thus, that efforts must be redirected towards the enforcement of DTTO/DRR and the insurance of completion.

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